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The Ulster Defence Association
A Short
History Part II
The Ulster Workers Strike
In May 1974 there
occurred what was perhaps the biggest, most audacious and certainly the
most unique campaign of civil disobedience and labour withdrawal within the
United Kingdom. This became known as the Ulster Workers Strike and the
Ulster Defence Association had a pivotal role within the strike, but their
role was not that of violent intimidation as has been alleged by various
Irish-Nationalist politicians and political commentators. The strike would
prove beyond doubt that compared to the potential political power of an
organised loyalist working-class the Provisional IRA and
Irish-Republicanism were little more than paper tiger imperialism. The
strike demonstrated the irrelevance of the P.I.R.A. when confronted when
confronted by a united Loyalist working-class opposition, but unfortunately
for the people of Northern Ireland the P.I.R.A. and the other agencies of
Irish Imperialism never had the perceptiveness to realise, or refused to
accept, their own negation.
In order to understand the Ulster Workers Strike it
is essential to understand the wider political context and in particular
the constitutional proposals that came to be know as the Sunningdale
Agreement. After the suspension of Stormont, and the spiraling violence
from 1972 onwards, the British state et al. tried to establish some sort of
mechanism by which a political solution could be found to the conflict
within Northern Ireland. The Conservative party began to move away from its
traditional support for the Union and embraced the idea of Unification
albeit with the consent of the majority of citizens within Northern
Ireland. The constitutional arrangements proposed were as follows: a
power-sharing executive, a 78 member elected Assembly and a Council of
Ireland. These proposals were outlined in the government white paper of the
20th March 1973 and on the 28th May elections were
then held that returned a majority of pro-white paper Assembly members but
the Unionist-Loyalist community were deeply split. These constitutional
arrangements were finalised at Sunningdale, Berkshire on the 6th
December 1973 when the Executive Designate meet in order to come to sort of
agreement in relation to North-South structures.
The British government attempted to cobble together
a coalition of moderate Unionism and Nationalism in order to make some sort
of working executive with Brian Faulkner (Ulster Unionist) as Chief
executive and Gerard “Gerry” Fitt (Social Democratic Labour Party) as
his Deputy. This was easier said than done, considering the fact that the
SDLP had done little to endear itself to Unionism and Loyalism pre-1973
with its calls for a ringing endorsement from the British and Irish
governments for Unification and joint sovereignty. There was opposition
within Unionism and Loyalism to the notion of power sharing as it appeared
to be completely at odds with previous democratic arrangements within
Northern Ireland and was in direct contrast to the democratic system on the
mainland of Britain. For many power sharing appeared to do nothing other
than allow those who wish to dissolve the Northern Ireland state a place in
the very apparatus of the state system from which to further their ultimate
political objectives. Whilst the concept of power sharing invoked hostility
from many within Unionism and Loyalism the most controversial proposal was
the idea of Council of Ireland. In his book “A History of Northern
Ireland” Patrick Buckland writes:
“Had matters been allowed to
rest with the formation of the Executive, its fate might have been a
happier one. But matters were not allowed to rest, for the price of
Southern and SDLP co-operation had to be paid – a consideration of the
Irish dimension…”
Of all aspects of the Sunningdale Agreement this was
probably the most contentious and resented by the loyalist people,
particularly as the aim of the Council was openly to bring about Irish
unity through a series of progressive steps. Coupled with this was the fact
that the Agreement was even challenged in the Republic of Ireland court
system as being unconstitutional.
It would not be long, however, before the loyalist people came out in open opposition and the Ulster Workers Council announced this opposition formally on the 14th May 1974. Harry Murray and Bob Pagels were chosen as the spokesmen to announce the beginning of what was to be a general strike aimed at ending what was for the Loyalist people a form of government that lacked any political legitimacy and contained within it a mechanism by which Unification could be achieved. From the start of the strike the leaders of the Ulster Defence Association, the organisation that would play a vital role in the success of the strike according to many commentators, realised that in order to be a success the campaign must not involve violence and other forms of crude intimidation against the working-class. Andy Tyrie, a leader of the U.D.A. said of the strike:
“I
had a meeting with the workers in my back garden when I lived in Glencairn
and we discussed the possibilities of a strike. I had to say to them,
‘Look, every time we have a stoppage it finishes up in violence.’ And
we talked about it and they said, ‘We think we can deliver the goods. We
can cut the power, we can bring the workers out’…I told them if we
could do it from a non-violent point of view, it means we will win…”
Quote
from ‘Loyalists’, author Peter Taylor
That is not the say that there were not subtle forms
of intimidation but the Ulster Workers Strike was a success not because of
violence or despite of violence but because it was by and large a
non-violent campaign of civil disobedience. Some commentators have argued
that the success of the campaign was also due in part to brilliant planning
but other accounts contradict this with strategy being decided on a more
day-to-day, hour-to-hour basis. In a way, however, this demonstrates the
flexibility that was present within the organisational command and control
structures. This flexibility in tactics would prove crucial as events
unfolded, for example: when the army pulled down Loyalist barricades
loyalists were instructed not to respond to state violence but to let the
state be exposed as the aggressors. Once the army had left the given area
the barricades were once again erected.
Leading members of the organisations involved in the
co-ordination of the strike admit that there were subtle forms of
discouragement used to prevent people from working and Andy Tyrie gives the
example of using cameras with no film in them to take pictures of workers
who refused to withdraw their labour. For many loyalists and unionists who
initially disagreed with the strike it was not that they disagreed with the
aims that the strikers hoped to achieve but that they had been involved in
previous stoppages and strikes in 1973 that had lasted two or three days
and achieved little or nothing but a hole in their wage packet. Once the
loyalist working class realised that this strike, the campaign of civil
disobedience was to be no flash in the pan, momentum began to grow and with
it the support of the Loyalist working-class. This support was greatly
increased by the ineptitude and sheer contempt of the British government in
particular the Prime Minister Harold Wilson who made what would later
become one of the most infamous and inflammatory speeches to have come from
a British Prime Minister against the Loyalist-Unionist-Protestant people of
Northern Ireland. In his speech he said:
“They (British tax payers)
have seen their sons vilified and spat upon and murdered. They have seen
the taxes they poured out almost with regard to cost – over £300 million
this year – going into Northern Ireland…. Yet people who benefit from
this now viciously defy Westminster, purporting to act as though they were
an elected government, spending their lives sponging on Westminster and
British democracy…Who do these people think they are?”
Link to text of speech: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/uwc/docs/hw25574.htm
The people he was referring to were the
Protestant-Loyalist-Unionist community and they thought of themselves as
every bit as British as the mainland taxpayer who resided in England,
Scotland or Wales. They found the broad sweeping comparison of the
Protestant-Unionist people with the activities of the sectarian murder
gangs of the IRA hard to stomach particularly as it was suggested that the
loyalist-unionist people in some way “benefited” from this situation or
would have wanted the spectre of sectarian violence and the murder of army
personnel. Of all the badly thought out tirade of misinformed prejudicial
utterances the “sponging” remark was the one that caused most
indignation and those who had any wavering doubts about the correctness of
the loyalist resistance and civil disobedience came out in open support of
the strikers by wearing small pieces of sponge attached to their shirts,
coats and outer garments.
During the time of the Ulster Workers Strike the
support gained for the strike had resulted in the reduction of the output
of one by one of the various electrical power stations. The workers in the
power stations simply refused to maintain them, they did not need to be
intimidated, they walked out in support of the strike. The army was sent in
to run the power stations but was unable to maintain output (output was
down by 60% province wide). This control of such vital resources was
crucial to the success of the strike as it demonstrated that the
power-sharing executive was politically bankrupt, lacked the support of the
loyalist working-class and was ultimately impotent when it came to the
running of the country. The control of fuel resources was also stopped and
petrol supplies to all but the most essential of users were curtailed.
There was a power vacuum and loyalists found that they had to step in for
the first time and actually begin to take over, to greater or less extent,
the functions (if not the offices) of the state. One U.D.A. leader alludes
to this in his recollection of the strike:
“Each UDA brigade, or
battalion or whatever, ran their own areas. They provided people with
whatever medication they needed, whatever food they needed, whatever
transport they needed…”
Quote from ‘Loyalists’, author
Peter Taylor
These were heady days
(albeit with some hardship) for the loyalist people and their leaders who
were effectively running the country and in the opinion of the author
proved that the country could be run by the loyalist people and their
organisations. Who better to administer the functions that the state system
at present performs centrally or through QUANGOS etc. for the loyalist
community than the loyalist community itself or those that are drawn from
the community and know its objective interests?
On the 28th May
1974 the power-sharing executive finally accepted the inevitable, that the
vast majority of people within Northern Ireland rejected the political
structures that had been put in place and that the executive had no
political legitimacy. Brian Faulkner Chief Executive of the power-sharing
executive resigned his position, as it was clear that the executive did not
have the support of the people, his other ministers followed suit. The
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees refused to meet with
the Ulster Workers Council and so the process simply collapsed. In loyalist
areas across Northern Ireland the people were ecstatic as the power and
might of the British government had been faced down by the organised power
of the loyalist working-class and their organisations. This was not a
victory for the “constitutional” politicians of Ulster politics,
although many of them were active within the strike or supported the aims
of it, but without the leadership of the Ulster Defence Association and coordinating
bodies such as the Ulster Workers Council it is doubtful that the strike
would ever have succeeded. The loyalist working-class had not only dealt
Irish interference a body blow but had also demonstrated the weakness of
Irish imperialism and in particular its violent state sponsored agencies,
namely the Provisional IRA. In much the same way that the early years of
loyalist resistance had been one of the Loyalist David facing the
Irish-Imperialist Goliath so once again loyalist resistance had seemingly
against the odds not had through the collective power of the loyalist
working class triumphed over Irish imperialism.
Commentators from the Irish nationalist community have said of the Belfast Agreement that it is “Sunningdale for slow learners” and this can be interpreted as directed against the loyalist community or a section of the loyalist community. This remark can, however, with equal vigour be re-directed at the Irish nationalist community, have they learnt any of the lessons from the past? Have they put aside physical force, sectarian violence and their irredentist imperialist claims? Are they willing to really make a political settlement work within the context of a stable Northern Ireland in which Northern Ireland Unionists and Loyalists no longer feel under siege? Are they willing to allow, and encourage, a genuine post-conflict healing process to develop in which not just the alleged abuses of the British state against Irish-Nationalists are brought to light and recited like a mantra but also too the injustices perpetrated against the Loyalist-Unionist-Protestant community by the Irish state and its imperialist agencies and indeed even on some occasions by the British state? Their words suggest they are but their actions suggest otherwise. Slow learners?